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Unmanned aircraft systems will be required to equip with a detect and avoid system in order 
to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to remain well clear of other aircraft. To comply 
with regulations in today’s operations manned aircraft must “see and avoid” other aircraft 
and use subjective judgment to determine whether those aircraft are well clear. For a detect-
and-avoid (DAA) system to satisfy the requirement to stay well clear, a quantitative 
definition of well clear needs to be defined and evaluated. Definitions for the boundary of 
well clear have been proposed by the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Executive 
Committee Science and Research Panel (SaRP) and the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 228 on Detect and Avoid Systems. This study 
investigates the interoperability implications of UAS using proposed well clear definitions as 
a separation standard for conducting operations in the national airspace system. The first 
analysis in the study focuses on the effect of variations in well clear definition parameters on 
the rate of losses of well clear per flight hour. The second analysis considers three well clear 
definitions and presents the relative state conditions of intruder aircraft as they encroach 
upon the well clear boundary. The third analysis focuses on the definition of the alerting 
criteria needed to inform the UAS operator of a potential loss of well clear. All three 
analyses are conducted in a NAS-wide fast-time simulation environment using UAS aircraft 
models, proposed UAS missions, and historical air defense radar data to populate the 
background traffic operating under visual flight rules. The results from the three analyses 
presented in this study inform the safety case, requirements development, and the 
operational environment for the DAA minimum operational performance standards. 
I. Introduction
egulations that establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are 
being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions.I  Those requirements will 
apply to the new detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the 
National Airspace System (NAS) and are determined according to their contribution to the overall safety case for 
such an integration. Several key gaps must be closed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace safety 
case. Foremost among these is calculation of the degree to which a particular system mitigates violation of an 
aircraft separation standard, which is known as the system’s “risk ratio.”VII  The risk ratio of a DAA system, in 
combination with risk ratios of other collision mitigation mechanisms, will determine the overall safety of the 
airspace measured in terms of the number of mid-air collisions per flight hour.  The second gap is the lack of a 
definition of a separation standard that the DAA system is intended to maintain,VI without which a risk ratio cannot 
be calculated.  A third gap is the alerting criteria needed for a UAS operator gain situation awareness and remain 
well clear of other aircraft. Defining and evaluating the risk ratios as a function of the DAA system parameters, the 
UAS separation standard, and the alerting criteria requires a simulation capability that incorporates aerodynamic 
performance and mission characteristics of future UAS operations.  Together, the UAS characteristics and DAA 
separation standard will allow determination of the frequency and types of encounters expected between UAS and 
manned aircraft that are necessary to calculate the risk ratio, develop the safety case, and develop the performance 
requirements of the DAA system. 
 Previous research investigating aircraft encounter rates and characteristics and the safety of new collision 
mitigation methods has largely been focused on the existing airspace and aircraft using existing separation 
standards.  This research established the risk ratio metric as a valid method of demonstrating that a safety standard 
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had been met.II Standards for collision avoidance systems (e.g. TCAS) and air traffic control (ATC)-provided 
separation were based on the performance of existing transponder and radar systems, respectively, along with human 
performance.  Separation standards for DAA systems cannot be determined in the same way because there are not 
yet any operational or performance requirements for such systems, so more recent approaches have focused on an 
acceptable risk of collision without a DAA system.X The UAS Executive Committee Science and Research Panel 
(SaRP) evaluated three candidate separation standards, however these definitions have not yet been converted into 
resulting risk ratios.VI Aircraft mission and aerodynamic performance parameters that are central to calculating risk 
ratios have also been based on existing airspace operations;V they do not incorporate a wide range of new UAS 
aircraft performance and mission characteristics.VI These characteristics are necessary because most manned aircraft 
in enroute and transition airspace fly from origin to destination along fixed airways, while many unmanned aircraft 
need to perform “mission-oriented” operations (e.g. flying a loitering pattern, grid pattern, or non-predetermined 
missions with frequently changing flight plans). This difference in mission profiles may create different conflict 
situations between unmanned and manned aircraft.II Several studies have investigated the airspace impact of a single 
UAS mission in northern California, but these analyses have not been extended to other geographic areas or 
included other UAS aircraft types or missions. XVII,III The key to demonstrating the requirements for safely 
integrating UAS with the NAS will be to extend such analyses to a representative set of UAS types and missions 
over a broad geographic area using candidate separation standards so that a collision mitigation risk ratio for DAA 
systems may be calculated. 
 The original contribution of the research reported in this paper is the denominator of the DAA risk ratio: the rate 
at which the DAA separation standard is violated given no collision mitigation methods are employed. This 
violation rate is provided as a function of the parameters of four different metrics for defining the separation 
standard, which will provide regulators tasked with selecting a single standard an understanding of how their 
selection may affect the predicted aircraft collision rate.  The sensitivity of the violation rate will also assist DAA 
system designers in selecting buffers around the separation standard that reduce the probability of violation without 
disrupting surrounding traffic. The simulations used to collect these statistics considered thousands of UAS flight 
plans and tens of thousands of UAS flight hours in many geographic areas so that the results would be broadly 
representative of domestic U.S. operations, allowing presentation of the metrics as a function of altitude and season. 
A secondary product of the analysis of encounter rates is determination of the relative states between encountering 
aircraft when the separation standard is violated. This information may be used to determine surveillance system 
requirements, establish initial conditions in Monte Carlo aircraft interaction simulations, provide guidelines for the 
design of DAA traffic displays for UAS pilots, and indicate the interoperability between the DAA separation 
standard and existing separation standards. A third contribution of this work considers the impact of the alerting 
logic on the UAS operator’s ability to maintain well clear of other aircraft. In particular, the timeliness, frequency, 
and reliability of the alerts presented to the operator are evaluated. This information can be used to inform the DAA 
sensor requirements, which have a large contribution to the risk ratio calculation and the safety case. The results 
presented in this paper represent an essential contribution to the calculation of the DAA risk ratio and therefore an 
important step in the design of systems and procedures that will support safe integration of UAS with the NAS.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the well clear definitions and alerting logic 
used in subsequent analyses; Section III outlines the three analysis methodologies; Section IV details the simulation 
methodology including the simulation platform, UAS models, traffic scenarios, mission description and mission 
implementation; Section V presents the results of the three analyses; and Section VI provides the concluding 
remarks. The first analysis presented in this paper evaluates the effect of the well clear definition parameters on the 
rate of losses of well clear. The second analysis instantiates three well clear definitions and evaluates the relative 
state information when there is a loss of well clear. The third analysis focuses on the alerting criteria and the 
characteristics at the instance of first alert. 
II. Definitions for Well Clear Analysis
 The FAA-sponsored Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) WorkshopI defines SAA as “the capability of a UAS to remain 
well clear from, and avoid collisions with, other airborne traffic. SAA provides the intended functions of self 
separation and collision avoidance compatible with expected behavior of aircraft operating in the NAS.” The self-
separation (SS) function of an SAA system is intended as a means of compliance with the regulatory requirements 
(14CFR Part 91, §91.111 and §91.113) to “see and avoid” and to remain “well clear” of other aircraft. Since the 
publication of that workshop report, the UAS community has shifted to using the term “detect and avoid” rather than 
“sense and avoid,” a distinction without a difference.  This paper will use DAA for consistency. 
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 The concept of well clear has been proposed as an airborne separation standard to which a DAA system must 
adhere,VI and performing SS correctly means remaining well clear of other aircraft. The well clear definition is a 
separation standard used by the SS function to determine what action is necessary to remain an appropriate distance 
from other aircraft. The standard will require a UAS be able to detect and avoid other aircraft in sufficient time as to 
avoid creating a collision hazard. The time or distance thresholds defining a loss of well clear could be unique for 
each intruder based on closure rate, performance characteristics, encounter geometry, and other variables. Therefore, 
it is necessary to define an explicit and quantitative definition of well clear so that the contribution of the SS 
function to the overall safety for a given airspace can be unambiguously determined.  
The second SAA workshopIV defines “well clear” as the state of maintaining a safe distance from other aircraft 
that would not normally cause the initiation of a collision avoidance(CA) maneuver by either aircraft. The following 
DAA implementation principles could also be utilized to define the well clear standard:V 
• Separation should be large enough to avoid corrective maneuvers from intruders (e.g., resolution
advisories for TCAS-equipped intruders), to minimize traffic alert issuances by controllers, and to avoid
excessive concern for proximate see-and-avoid pilots;
• Deviations should be small enough to avoid disruptions to traffic flow and vary appropriately with
encounter geometry and operational areas (e.g. terminal, transition, enroute).
Ongoing research efforts are identifying quantifications for these DAA interoperability criteria; however assessing 
the overall impact to the NAS is still an open research area. This paper aims to address the impact on the NAS due 
to quantification of these criteria by determining how frequently aircraft operating in class E airspace  and transiting 
to class A airspace encounter each other as a function of the well clear boundary definition and the nature of the 
UAS mission profiles. The proposed definitions are taken from a recent FAA report,VI a dedicated US Government 
workshop on well clear,VI and variations on methods used by TCAS II.VII 
A metric originally used in the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) collision detection logicVII 
to estimate the time to closest point of approach between two aircraft is based on the concept of “tau,” which is 
calculated as the ratio of slant range between aircraft to their range rate and measured in seconds:   𝜏 = − !!                (1) 
The TCAS detection logic also includes a vertical metric that approximates the time until both aircraft will be at co-
altitude. This metric is referred to as vertical tau and is calculated as the ratio of the difference in altitude to the 
vertical range rate and measured in seconds: 𝜏!"#$ = − !!!! (2) 
Note that a tau value is positive when the UAS and the intruder are on converging paths and negative when they 
are on diverging paths. Tau represents an approximation of the time to closest point of approach (CPA). The CPA is 
defined as the minimum slant range between aircraft pairs, and in the case of a direct collision course (separation at 
the CPA is zero) the tau computation is equal to time to CPA. If the aircraft are not on a collision course, then tau is 
only an approximation of time to CPA. In this case, the CPA serves as an asymptote to the tau metric (since 𝑟 = 0 at 
CPA), and therefore the minimum value of tau will occur just prior to the CPA. Since the ratio of range to range rate 
will generally be lower with closer points of approach, this minimum value of tau approximates the severity of the 
encounter. This property of tau means that selection of a minimum tau value at which to alert for a loss of well clear 
determines not only the time to react to the threat, but also the size of protected airspace within which a given threat 
encounter will cause an alert. When an intruder aircraft is predicted to create an encounter with a tau value below the 
minimum, the DAA system may trigger an alert to an imminent loss of well clear.  
One issue with the tau metric occurs for encounters where the rate of closure is very low, as described in the 
TCAS II Manual.VII For these encounters the calculated tau may be large while the physical separation may be quite 
small. In such a situation, the calculated tau value no longer assures adequate separation because a sudden 
acceleration that increases the closure rate (e.g., a turn) would not give sufficient alerting time to avoid a loss of well 
clear or even a near mid-air collision (NMAC). An NMAC is defined by an aircraft pair coming within proximity of 
less than 500 ft radial horizontal and 100 ft vertical separation from each other. To provide protection in these types 
of encounters, a modified alerting threshold, often referred to as “modified tau,” is used by TCAS II.VII,VIII This 
metric uses a new parameter, “distance modification” (DMOD), to provide a minimum range at which to alert 
regardless of the calculated value of tau. Modified tau is computed as  𝜏!"# = − !!!!"#!!  !! 𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝑟 ≥ 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷0 𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝑟 < 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷 , (3) 
where the distance modification represents a threat boundary encircling the ownship aircraft that triggers an alert 
when the boundary is violated. The value(s) of the constant DMOD used for a well-clear separation standard is an 
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independent variable in the well-clear definition. For the purposes of this study, three sets of DMOD constants will 
be investigated to gauge the sensitivity of losses of well clear to this parameter. The modified tau metric was 
introduced to address the slow-rate-of-closure scenarios that caused a safety hazard not identified by the tau metric, 
however modified tau also has limitations. For situations in which aircraft are on converging paths with a high rate 
of closure and a large miss distance, the modified tau metric will indicate an alert is required. This type of alert 
would be considered a “nuisance” to the UAS operator, as the system could alert even when the miss distance is 
much larger than DMOD. To illustrate this scenario, consider two aircraft on converging paths traveling on opposite 
headings at 600 knots and horizontally offset by 5.9 nmi. In this scenario, the minimum modified tau measurement 
would be at 35 seconds, which hypothetically could be below an alerting threshold instructing the pilot to initiate a 
collision avoidance maneuver. However these aircraft are separated by 5.9 nmi at CPA which is greater than the 
enroute radar separation used by air traffic controllers. TCAS II addresses this limitation in the tau and modified tau 
measures by applying a horizontal miss distance (HMD) filter at CPA. This filter removes alerts for encounters in 
which separation at CPA is greater than the HMD parameter.V  
 The first definition presented in this work considers the minimum protected airspace between pairs of aircraft in 
order to establish a relationship between the time-based modified tau parameter and the rate of encounters 
experienced between UAS and VFR aircraft for a range of time thresholds. It considers the time threshold as an 
independent variable. The second definition considers three candidate well clear definitions and investigates the 
rates of losses of well clear for those given definitions. The third definition considers the alerting threshold and the 
state information of the intruder relative to the ownship at the instant the system alerts the pilot to a threat. 
A. Definition 1: Minimum Airspace Separation
This definition considers the minimum airspace separation between pairs of aircraft using the modified tau and
time to co-altitude with a horizontal miss distance at CPA metrics to define the volume of the airspace between the 
UAS ownship and intruder aircraft. Consider the time history of a given pair of aircraft on converging paths and 
compute a separation metric associated with modified tau and time to co-altitude given as    𝐽! = 𝜏!"#! + 𝜏!"#$! 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒     𝜏!"# ≥ 0, 𝜏!"#$ ≥ 0, 𝑟!! 𝑡!"#   ≤ 𝐻𝑀𝐷∗,𝛥ℎ   ≤ 𝑍𝑇𝐻𝑅∞ 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 , (4) 
where 𝐻𝑀𝐷∗ is the horizontal miss distance threshold, 𝑍𝑇𝐻𝑅 is the vertical separation threshold, 𝛥ℎ is the current 
vertical separation, 𝑟!" 𝑡!"#  is the predicted horizontal miss distance at CPA, and 𝜏!"# , 𝜏!"#$ denote the modified 
tau and time to co-altitude calculations given by equations (2) and (3), respectively. The larger the value of the 
separation metric 𝐽!, the more airspace is separating the UAS ownship and the intruder aircraft. Definition 1 is 
defined as the couple 𝜏!"# , 𝜏!"#$  such that the cost in (4) is minimized. This couple indicates the point at which 
the minimum separation exists between the aircraft pair with respect to time and space. This study considers several 
configurations of Definition 1 in the subsequent analysis. One such configuration (D1.1) corresponds to the TCAS II 
values for DMOD, ZTHR, and HMD for Class E airspace between 10,000-20,000 ft. The other configurations are 
effectively perturbations of the DMOD, ZTHR and HMD parameters of D1.1. Each definition configuration is 
detailed in Table 1. 
Configuration DMOD [nmi] ZTHR [ft] HMD [ft] 
D1.1 0.80 600 4861 
D1.2 0.80 450 4861 
D1.3 0.80 800 4861 
D1.4 0.55 600 3342 
D1.5 1.10 600 4861 
D1.6 0.55 600 3342 
D1.7 1.20 600 7292 
D1.8 0.80 600 4000 
D1.9 0.80 475 6000 
Table 1: Minimum Airspace Separation Configuration Parameters. 
B. Definition 2: Well Clear Boundary
The remaining definitions differ from Definition 1 by fixing the threshold values rather than considering them as 
independent variables.  The remaining definitions are considered qualitative definitions of well clear as a separation 
standard. These definitions will be used to determine whether one aircraft has violated the well clear boundary of 
another aircraft. Definition 2 is the most similar to the detection logic in TCAS II and consists of a set of criteria 
4  
 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
5 
based on the time to co-altitude and modified tau definitions. This definition consists of temporal and distance-based 
criteria in the horizontal dimension as 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛  1:    0   ≤   𝜏!"# ≤ 𝜏!"#∗       𝐴𝑁𝐷      𝑟!" 𝑡!"#   ≤ 𝐻𝑀𝐷∗ ,       (7) 
and criteria in the vertical dimension as 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛  2:    0   ≤   𝜏!"#$ ≤ 𝜏!"#$∗       𝑂𝑅       𝛥ℎ   ≤ 𝑍𝑇𝐻𝑅 ,         (8) 
where  𝜏!"#$∗  and 𝜏!"#∗  are the time to co-altitude and tau thresholds, respectively. From (7) and (8), a loss of well 
clear (LOWC) is defined as  𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐶:    𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛  1  𝑖𝑠  𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒    𝐴𝑁𝐷  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛  2  𝑖𝑠  𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒.         (9) 
This study considers two configurations for this definition based on the investigation of well clear definitions 
proposed by the SaRP. The SaRP chose three well clear definitions, tuning parameter values in each definition to 
meet a common threshold of 1.5% for unmitigated near mid-air collision (NMAC) risk using MIT Lincoln Lab’s 
Uncorrelated Encounter Model.IX The parameters of two such well clear definitions are detailed in Table 2, while 
the third well clear definition proposed by the SaRP is not presented in this work. The third definition that is 
considered in this study (D2.3) has the same parameters as D2.2, however the altitude separation threshold, denoted 
as ZTHR, is less than the distance that air traffic controllers would consider as operationally acceptable separation 
with VFR traffic (500 ft). 
Configuration 𝜏!"#∗  [sec] 𝜏!"#$∗  [sec] DMOD [nmi] ZTHR [ft] HMD [ft] 
D2.1 30 20 0.987 475 6000 
D2.2 35 0 0.658 700 4000 
D2.3 35 0 0.658 450 4000 
Table 2: Well Clear Boundary Configuration Parameters. 
C. Definition 3: Alerting Threshold
The prior definitions are primarily focused on quantifying well clear and gauging the sensitivity to parameter
variations within the well clear definition. Another important factor in safe operations is the pilot’s ability to gain 
situation awareness of a conflict and have sufficient time to avoid violating the quantified well clear protected 
airspace between the UAS and an intruding aircraft. Definition 3 considers the temporal threshold, referred to as the 
self-separation threshold (SST), at which the DAA system should alert the pilot of an imminent threat. The 
definition is the same as the definition given by Criteria 1 and 2 in (7) and (8), respectively. The parameters that are 
considered for the modified tau alerting threshold definition are detailed in Table 3. 
Configuration SST: 𝜏!"#∗  [sec] 𝜏!"#$∗  [sec] DMOD [nmi] ZTHR [ft] HMD [ft] 
D3.1 90 0 0.658 450 4000 
D3.2 90 0 0.658 700 4000 
D3.3 110 0 0.658 700 4000 
D3.4 70 0 0.658 700 4000 
D3.5 90 0 0.987 700 6000 
D3.6 90 0 0.9875 900 6000 
Table 3: Alerting Threshold Configuration Parameters. 
III. Analyses of Well Clear Definitions
Three analyses of well clear definitions and alerting criteria are considered in this study. This study focuses on 
encounters between UAS and aircraft operating under visual flight rules (VFR) carrying a transponder that uses the 
1200 Mode A transponder code (referred to as cooperative VFR aircraft). Future work will consider encounters with 
aircraft that are not equipped with a transponder (referred to as non-cooperative VFR aircraft). 
Analysis 1: Evaluating the effect of well clear definitions on the rate of loss of well clear. 
In this analysis, the frequency of losses of well clear between UAS and manned VFR aircraft are measured as a 
function of the parameters defining a loss of well clear, including tau, DMOD, miss-distance filters, and vertical 
separation thresholds. This analysis investigates the rate of losses of well clear when a DAA mitigation is not 
present.  
Analysis 2: Characterizing encounters at the well clear boundaries. 
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This analysis focuses on the characteristics of UAS encounters with manned cooperative VFR aircraft, including 
range rates, relative heading and separation, and percentage of maneuvering intruders at the well clear boundary. 
The objective of this analysis is to study the relative time and distance separations between aircraft at the 
boundary of a well clear definition. 
Analysis 3: Evaluating the alerting threshold definition and alerting criteria. 
This analysis considers criteria for alerting the UAS operator that action is necessary to avoid a loss of well clear. 
The parameters of each definition are varied and the analysis focuses on the relative state  information at the first 
alert. In particular the range rates, relative heading and separation are of interest, as well  as the percentage of 
alerts that do not result in a loss of well clear. This analysis informs the  minimum sensor range required based on 
alerting criteria, as well as the rate of nuisance alerts due to buffers on the well-clear boundary. 
IV. Methodology
A. Simulation Platform
The Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES) is a National Airspace System (NAS)-wide fast-time
simulation tool.X The ACES platform models and simulates the NAS using interacting agents representing center 
control, terminal flow management, airports, individual flights, and other NAS elements. These agents pass 
messages between one another to model real-world information flows. This distributed agent-based system is 
designed to emulate the highly interconnected nature of the NAS, making it a suitable tool to evaluate current and 
envisioned airspace concepts. The approach of this study is to use ACES to investigate the effects of well clear 
definitions for UAS DAA systems in enroute and transition airspace. The ACES platform provides a large set of 
four-degree-of-freedom (4 DOF) aircraft models, including many models that mimic the flight characteristics of 
UAS aircraft (such as Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, etc.), as discussed in Section IV.B. below.  
One of the inputs to ACES is the flight demand set, which consists of all of the flights to be simulated with their 
aircraft type, their departure and arrival airports, their departure times and their flight plans. In this study, UAS 
mission flight demand sets are used as inputs to the ACES platform, as well as VFR aircraft. The VFR aircraft flight 
data sets are synthesized from air defense radar data. 
B. UAS Aircraft Models
The aircraft models used in this study are derived using performance data from the Base of Aircraft Data
(BADA) models. The BADA models were generated from industry dataXI and validated by Intelligent Automation 
Inc. (IAI).XII The performance specifications required to conduct given UAS missions are detailed in Table 4, along 
with representative aircraft types whose performance would at least meet that which is required for the particular 
mission.   
Mission Aircraft Cruise Altitude 
 [ft] 
Cruise 
Speed 
[kts] 
Flight 
Count 
Flight 
Duration 
Total 
Flight 
Hours 
Cargo Transport Cessna 208 
Caravan (C208) 
2,000-16,000 MSL 146-308 1,400 20-200 min. 1887 
On Demand Air Taxi Cessna Citation 
Mustang (C510) 
10,000-33,000 
MSL 
156-340 3,180 20-45 min. 1016 
On Demand Air Taxi Cirrus (SR22T) 6,000-11,000 MSL 153-166 8,720 20-45 min. 5533 
Strategic Fire Monitoring Reaper (MQ-9) 31,000 MSL 209 324 20 hrs. 5172 
Tactical Fire Monitoring Shadow (RQ7B) 3,000 AGL 72-80 2,496 1-1.5 hrs. 3164 
Atmospheric Sampling Global Hawk 
(RQ4A) 
5,000-35,000 AGL 151-343 2,401 1.5-13 hrs. 6261 
Air Quality Monitoring Shadow (RQ7B) 3,000-10,000 AGL 72-97 1308 1-4 hrs. 2283 
Flood Inundation 
Mapping 
Aerosonde 
(MK47) 
4,000 AGL 46-51 127 1-4 hrs. 177 
Stream Flow Monitoring Aerosonde 
(MK47) 
4,000 AGL 46-51 202 1-4 hrs. 236 
Table 4: Performance Data for UAS Missions using BADA-based aircraft models 
C. Traffic Scenarios
For this study, a NAS-wide simulation in ACES, manned VFR traffic and unmanned aircraft performing a
variety of representative missions at different altitudes were simulated in ACES. The VFR traffic was collected by 
the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) at Hill AFB, Utah. The RADES collects data through the Eastern and 
Western Defense sectors and provides those data to a variety of government entities, including the FAA and 
Department of Defense.  The squadron ensures that there is reliable and accurate sensor information for air traffic to 
support day-to-day operations, contingencies and specialized activities (e.g. counter-narcotics, search and rescue, 
etc.). To accomplish this, they maintain continuous real-time feeds from short-range radars in the interior of the 
United States and long-range air route surveillance radars that cover the perimeter. The RADES provides track 
updates on both cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft, however this study focuses on encounters between UAS 
and cooperative VFR aircraft. Future work will investigate the encounter characteristics of non-cooperative VFR 
aircraft. The raw radar-return data includes: time, the four-digit Mode A identifying code squawked by the aircraft, 
quantized pressure altitude measurements reported by the target, and range and azimuth measurements. To build 
tracks to use in the ACES simulation, several days of data were processed from four different months in 2012. To 
process the data, the raw radar measurements were fused together into a single track using a minimum-spanning tree 
clustering algorithm.XIII A Kalman filter was then used to smooth the tracks, and flight plan waypoints were 
extracted from the smoothed trajectory. The ACES platform requires each aircraft to have a departure and arrival 
airport, thus airports are added to the beginning and end of each VFR smoothed track to run in the simulation. 
January 2012 
Su M Tu W Th F Sa 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
29 30 31 
 
April 2012 
Su M Tu W Th F Sa 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
29 30 
 
July 2012 
Su M Tu W Th F Sa 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
29 30 31 
October 2012 
Su M Tu W Th F Sa 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
28 29 30 31 
 
Table 5: Selected days in 2012 for VFR traffic scenarios.
 
 
A select number of days were chosen across the four seasons of 2012 such that no adverse meteorological 
conditions were impacting the VFR traffic densities.  Different days of the week and different weeks in each of the 
months were selected to account for variability in weekday and seasonal traffic densities. The selected days used in 
this simulation are shown in Table 5 in beige. To characterize the VFR traffic the number of aircraft tracks, 
geographic distribution of tracks, and the traffic density by altitude are given in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3. 
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Figure 1: Number of VFR aircraft tracks in scenario by month. 
 It is evident from Figure 1, that there is no clear trend for aircraft volume by day of the week, however the 
summer and fall months tend to produce larger volumes than the winter and spring months. The total number of 
flights per day ranges from 20,000 to 28,000 and on averages is approximately 23,000. 
 An overlay of all VFR aircraft tracks for a single day is given in Figure 2. The radar covers most of the 
continental United States (CONUS), and it is clear from Figure 2 that many of the VFR flights occur around larger 
cities and areas of dense population.  
Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of VFR Flights for July 22nd 2012. 
 Figure 3 shows the number of VFR aircraft in the CONUS by the time of day and altitude. This graphic shows 
that the majority of aircraft operate under 10,000 ft and between 14:00 UTC and 20:00 UTC. The UAS missions 
selected for this study operate at similar altitudes and times as the VFR traffic, because the DAA system is expected 
to provide separation primarily from VFR aircraft. The objective of this study is to understand how often these 
aircraft encounter each other in the absence of separation mitigations, and the nature of the encounters. This analysis 
will motivate the development of alerting and surveillance requirements and support the safety case for a DAA 
system. 
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Figure 3: Number of VFR aircraft as given by time of day and altitude level for July 25th 2012. 
D. UAS Mission Descriptions
The FAA’s UAS Integration Concept of OperationsXIV requires that UAS operate under instrument flight rules 
(IFR) and conduct operations in airspace not segregated from manned air traffic. One key challenge for UAS 
integration into the NAS is that the operations and flight characteristics typical of UAS differ from those of most 
manned IFR aircraft. While manned IFR aircraft usually fly from origin to destination airport along fixed airways 
and jet routes at a single cruise altitude, UAS are expected to fly “mission oriented” flight plans that can include 
many turns and altitude changes within a limited geographic area. The differences in flight plans between UAS and 
manned IFR aircraft will create different encounter rates and characteristics, so it is necessary to model expected 
UAS operations in order to accurately predict the safety of DAA systems that will enable UAS-NAS integration. 
The mission characteristics used in this study are consistent with the missions outlined in the FAA CONOPS,XIV 
RTCA DO-320,XV and a recent Volpe Report.XVI Intelligent Automation Inc. developed the mission sets, in 
collaboration with and under the supervision of NASA.XVII,XVIII 
Weather	  and	  Atmospheric	  Data	  Collection	  
One proposed use of UAS is the collection and monitoring of atmospheric and weather data. This information is 
needed to evaluate and predict winds aloft so that aircraft can fly fuel-efficient routes and to feed weather forecasts 
on which many sectors of the economy depend. Atmospheric data collection is most accurately done today by the 
release of weather balloons, which is done from 91 stations across the continental U.S. The data is obtained from 
radiosondes that are attached to the balloons and are carried through the troposphere into the stratosphere, 
transmitting the collected information back to a receiving station on the ground. This data includes vertical profiles 
of temperature, humidity, wind speed and direction, atmospheric pressure, and geopotential height.  
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Figure 4: NAS-wide UAS Atmospheric Sampling Missions, UAS tracks in white 
UAS could offer a distinct advantage in atmospheric data collection over weather balloons as they would provide 
a persistent observation capability and would be capable of flying to those areas in which data is most required, not 
simply those 91 fixed locations.  A long endurance UAS would also provide round-the-clock data collection 
capabilities and could repeatedly climb and descend between 5,000 and 35,000 ft to sample the profile of 
atmospheric information.   
For the mission simulated in this study, the NAS was divided into 60 grid cells and a fleet of long-endurance 
turbojet UAS were assigned to each cell.  Each fleet provided a complete sample of the geographic and altitude-
related variations in atmospheric data every four hours.  The flight plans for this UAS mission are shown in Figure 
4. The aircraft used to perform this mission have the performance characteristics of a Global Hawk, able to cruise at 
40,000 ft and 350 kts for 24+ hours.
Cargo/Freight	  Operations	  
UAS may be used to supplement or replace the small manned aircraft currently used in the air cargo 
transportation industry. Air freight delivery to small markets with light turboprop or piston aircraft is done from 
regional airports on an as-needed or infrequent basis.  Cargo weighing less than 2000 lb is “forwarded” to one of 
893 airports across the U.S., and on long flights may require either a second pilot to make the return trip or the first 
pilot to remain at the destination until they’ve rested for the required duration.  Between 80,000 and 100,000 Cessna 
Caravan 208 flights carried out such cargo operations each year between 2002 and 2011. A UAS could offer lower 
operating costs and higher productivity than a manned cargo operation. The operating costs might be reduced 
because fewer personnel would be required for a given operation. Production costs could be lower than manned 
aircraft as some safety critical systems are no longer necessary when the pilot is not present in the cockpit (e.g., life 
support). Higher aircraft productivity is possible due to the absence of crew flight time limitations and the need to 
return crews to their operating base. These advantages of UAS cargo operations are especially evident with small 
planes, where there is a narrower profit margin (e.g., crew salary expenses constitute a relative large percentage of 
operating cost).  
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Figure 5: UAS Cargo Mission Flight Profiles. 
The UAS flights selected for this mission directly replace existing light turboprop and piston cargo operations to 
one of the 893 airports listed as receiving small amounts of cargo in the Transportation Systems Analysis Model 
(TSAM) simulation tool.XIX The number of daily flights is determined by the average volume of cargo received by 
that airport in 2012 and the relative life cycle and marginal operating costs of traditional manned cargo aircraft and a 
remotely piloted UAS.  Nearly 500 of these flights operate each day and typically cruise between 10,000 and 18,000 
ft.  The origin-destination airport pairs for this mission are shown in Figure 5. The aircraft used to perform this 
mission have the performance characteristics of a Cessna Caravan 208, able to cruise up to 18,000 ft and 170 kts for 
3+ hours. 
Strategic	  and	  Tactical	  Wildfire	  Monitoring	  
Manned aircraft support of wildfire fighting is currently primarily tactical: direct air tanker drops of fire 
retardants, transportation of personnel and equipment and some aerial observation.  This support is nearly always 
done for existing wildfires to which firefighters are already responding, but interviews of fire professionals indicated 
that additional tactical observation and real-time relay of fire imagery would increase the effectiveness of 
firefighting operations.  They also indicated that ongoing, strategic monitoring of areas with the greatest potential 
for wildfires would likely decrease response time to fire events and ensure the fires are smaller and easier to contain 
when first responders arrive. Although there is no precedent for such widespread and continuous strategic 
monitoring, experts believe such a capability would be justified given that it may cost more than $1 million per day 
to fight a large wild land fire.
Significant expert input was used to construct the UAS missions for tactical and strategic fire fighting because of 
the novelty of these operations.XVII The historical record of wildfires between 2002 and 2011 was used to select 
operating areas for the tactical observation mission along with the airports from which the UAS would be based.  To 
model the priority that wildfires threatening urban areas would receive for remote observation, those 17 states with 
OEP35 airports that constituted 90 percent of the historical wildfires were selected as the mission areas.  Small 
airports near these mission areas were selected as UAS bases.  The UAS used in this operation would be relatively 
small, in the Shadow-B class of aircraft, in order to balance performance and cost.  Operations are conducted at 
3000 ft with each mission lasting between 1 and 1.5 hours and departing at regular intervals to provide continuous 
coverage over the multi-day timeframe that large wildfires may take to bring under control. 
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Figure 6:  Strategic wildfire monitoring mission flight plans, where the green represents the departure 
airport and the white lines represent the UAS flight path. 
A burn probability map developed by the Missoula Fire Science Laboratory was used to select the observation 
areas for the strategic wildfire detection and monitoring mission.XVII This map is based on the likelihood of wildfires 
occurring each year in a given area based on atmospheric conditions, local geography, extent and type of available 
fuel, and other factors.  Twenty six missions operating out of twenty four airports were selected to cover all areas of 
the U.S. that are predicted to have greater than a 1% chance of burning in a wildfire each year.  UAS depart on each 
mission with a frequency that ensures each location on the burn map is observed at least once every two hours.  The 
aircraft cruise at 31,000 ft, an altitude that represents a compromise between larger surveillance areas available at 
higher altitudes and the better geographic resolution available to the infrared sensor at lower altitudes.  Each flight is 
limited to 4400 nmi and 20 hours. These characteristics match that of NASA’s Ikhana aircraft, a Predator B variant, 
which conducted a series of similar wildfire monitoring missions in 2007.XX 
Air	  Quality	  Monitoring	  
Air quality standards for six common air pollutants are set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in 
part to preserve the health and economic well being of local communities. The degree to which these standards are 
met is currently evaluated through the use of fixed and mobile ground sensors, weather balloons and sondes, manned 
aircraft flights, and satellites. One common limitation of all of these methods is the lack of persistent data collection 
over time and geography. This limitation causes significant gaps in data and an incomplete account of the state of 
the air pollutants as air quality fluctuates throughout the day. When maturing UAS technologies reduce operating 
costs they may be suitable for routine air quality monitoring missions because they would offer an ability to 
maintain persistent surveillance at a fraction of the cost of traditional sensors. The regions with the worst air 
pollution and therefore the most likely to employ UAS for air quality monitoring were identified from the American 
Lung Association’s State of the Air 2012 report.XXI 
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Figure 7: UAS flight paths to monitor air quality daily in Los Angeles County, CA, where the green 
represents the departure airport and the white lines represent the UAS flight path. 
The air quality monitoring mission involves a UAS departing from one of 87 airports located in highly polluted 
regions, flying a “radiator-grill” pattern across the region between 4,000 ft. and 6,000 ft. AGL, continuously 
collecting pollutant data and returning to the same airport. UAS flights depart from each airport at midnight, 5 AM, 
12 PM, and 6 PM local time to collect data at regular intervals. The Shadow-B (RQ7B) was the UAS modeled for 
this mission due to its long endurance and range, medium-sized payload capability, and its range of cruise speeds. 
On-­‐Demand	  Air	  Taxi	  Service	  
Air taxi services in the U.S. are limited to niche markets serving small communities, islands without regularly 
scheduled commercial service, or executive travelers.  Reduction in service to small and medium sized airports since 
the 2007 recession,XXII increasing hassles of flying through large commercial hubs and improvements in scheduling 
algorithms to match traveler demand with aircraft availability are driving increased interest in this type of service, 
however it remains more expensive than most comparable air carrier fares.  Pilots constitute a significant fraction of 
overall flight operating expenses and automation may be able to play a role in decreasing costs, increasing the 
number of air taxi operations that occur in the U.S.  
Figure 8:  On-demand air taxi service flights 
Two types of UAS-enabled air taxi services were created for this mission: a remotely piloted version that would 
have lower automation-conversion costs but higher per-hour operating costs, and a fully automated version that is 
more expensive to develop but over the long term would be less expensive to operate and therefore result in a larger 
number of flights.XVII Two aircraft used for air taxi operations in the past were studied for each of the automation 
levels, a Cessna Mustang and a Cirrus SR-22T.  The number of daily flights and their origin-destination pairs were 
determined with TSAM by comparing expected operating costs with alternative modes of transportation.  The 
resulting network of daily flights for the remotely piloted mission is shown in Figure 8.  These SR-22T flights cruise 
13  
at 10,000 ft and 180 kts and, based on surveys of public acceptance of small aircraft and remotely piloted 
operations,XXII could constitute up to 7,000 flights per day in the coming decades. 
Flood	  Mapping	  and	  Stream	  Flow	  Monitoring	  
Flooding takes a significant toll in terms of human and economic costs each year in the U.S., however there are 
no existing systematic aerial mapping programs during the course of floods or an ability to relay real-time data to 
responders on the ground.  Only during large-scale events such as the September 2013 Colorado floods were 
manned aircraft used to map the extent of the inundation and measure flow characteristics using LiDAR, particle 
image velocimetry and sondes.  Those aerial operations cost up to $1.5 million because of the specialized 
instrumentation used to collect the required data. In part because of these costs and because manned aircraft were 
grounded due to weather, the Boulder County Emergency Operations Center contracted to fly a Falcon UAV for 
damage assessment for three days in the vicinity of Lyons, Colorado.XXIII  
Figure 9: Stream flow monitoring missions near Atlanta, Georgia, where the green represents the departure 
airport and the white lines represent the UAS flight path. 
Experts at the USGS and NOAA anticipate that UAS may eventually aid in the mapping of existing flood events, 
conduct damage assessment and victim location missions, collect data to improve hydrologic models and forecast 
flood propagation and impact.  They would be employed to monitor stream-flow conditions before and after flood 
events, including channel depth, mean velocity, and debris contents.  This type of mission follwed a grid pattern 
along the stream direction at 4000 ft using a small UAS operated out of an airport close to the area being monitored. 
This altitude was selected to balance the required resolution of the sensors with a need to scan a large area. Smaller 
streams would need to be monitored several times per day because flow rate fluctuations can be higher than large 
river systems, which would typically require only one daily observation. An example stream-monitoring mission in 
the vicinity of Atlanta, Georgia, is shown in Figure 9. A second type of mission was flown only during flood 
inundation events to continuously monitor the extent of the flood impact and relay imagery to ground personnel 
from an altitude of 4000 ft.  Both missions used a small UAS in the Aerosonde or Puma class of vehicle capable of 
remaining aloft for one to two hours and cruising under 50 kts. 
E. UAS Mission Implementation
The proposed UAS missions detailed in Section D were identified by the stakeholder community and literature 
reviews, constructed by talking to subject matter experts, socio-economic analysis, and stakeholder input, and 
verified through simulation. Each mission consists of a set of flights that have altitude, speed, aircraft performance, 
takeoff times, duration, and geographic constraints that are dictated by that mission’s requirements and objectives. 
This study does not include a mitigation to separate aircraft; therefore the UAS missions will come within close 
proximity to VFR traffic and other UAS. For this study, interactions between UAS are not analyzed and do not 
affect the encounter statistics. Each UAS flight is independent of the others in analysis and simulation, therefore all 
UAS missions were combined in a single flight data set, which was run in simulation against different days of VFR 
traffic. The UAS flight data set consists of the nine missions outlined in Section D, totaling approximately 18,000 
flights and 26,000 flight hours over a 24-hour period. 
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V. Simulation Results
A. Analysis 1
Analysis 1 evaluates the effect of parameters of the well clear definition on the rate of losses of well clear per
flight hour. Definition 1 is used as a measure to evaluate the rate of losses of well clear, and each parameter 
variation in Table 1 represents perturbations of the baseline parameter set which is defined as D1.1. For each 
occurrence in which a VFR aircraft was on a converging path with a UAS and the modified tau and time to co-
altitude metrics are at minima, according to the criteria of Definition 1, then the aircraft pair is recorded as an 
encounter. Since the simulations protocol calls for no mitigations to separate UAS and VFR aircraft, each encounter 
will progress until the aircraft are no longer on converging paths, which occurs at the closest point of approach.  
Figure 10 depicts a cumulative distribution of encounters per flight hour as a function of the minimum modified 
tau for a given time to co-altitude and with the parameters of definition D1.1 (DMOD=0.80 nmi, ZTHR=600 ft, and 
HMD=4000 ft). This plot demonstrates the impact of setting a time to co-altitude parameter for a given tau 
threshold. For instance, consider a well clear definition given by the criteria in Definition 2, that has a modified tau 
threshold of 40 seconds, the parameters given by D1.1 and a time to co-altitude threshold of 30 seconds. Figure 10 
implies that definition would yield approximately 0.033 losses of well clear per flight hour, (or 1 loss of well clear 
every 30.3 hours). It is evident from the contours of increasing time to co-altitude parameters that the time to co-
altitude has minimal impact on encounter rate at lower values (0-30 seconds). This results from the lack of high 
vertical closure rate encounters between UAS and VFR aircraft to generate a protected airspace around the UAS that 
is sufficiently larger than the threat boundary (defined by ZTHR=600 ft, and HMD=4000 ft). Figure 10 and the 
subsequent plots in Analysis 1 are particularly useful in gauging the relative impact of making adjustments to the 
definition of well clear and the alerting criteria to inform the UAS operator of a potential loss of well clear. 
Figure 10: Cumulative distribution of encounters per flight hour as a function of minimum modified tau and 
time to co-altitude with well clear parameters given by D1.1 (DMOD=0.80 nmi, ZTHR=600 ft, and 
HMD=4000 ft). 
Figure 10 shows the aggregate statistics of all the encounters that were generated across the 20 simulated days from 
2012. Taking the definition D1.1 and time to co-altitude of 30 seconds, the cumulative distribution is presented in 
Figure 11, where the colored regions give the relative ratio of encounters occurring at different altitude bands. 
Similar to Figure 10, the interpretation of Figure 11 implies that if a modified tau threshold was selected at 40 
seconds an encounter would occur once every 33 hours, and of the encounters that occurred 60% would happen 
between 2000- 6000 ft, 25% between 1000-2000 ft, 20% between 6000-10,000 ft and 5% would occur less than 
1000 ft or greater than 10,000 ft. According to this figure, the greatest contribution of encounters comes from the 
altitude bands between 1000 ft and 6000 ft. This is expected, as the density of VFR traffic is highest at that altitude 
range. 
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Figure 11: Cumulative distribution of encounters per flight hour as a function of minimum modified tau and 
relative altitude ratio with parameters given by D1.1 (DMOD=0.80 nmi, ZTHR=600 ft, and HMD=4000 ft) 
and time to co-altitude of 30 seconds. 
The figures in Analysis 1 will focus on the perturbations of three parameters of the well clear definition: the 
horizontal miss distance, ZTHR, and DMOD. Similar to Figure 10 and Figure 11, the subsequent plots will present 
the cumulative plot of encounter rate per flight hour as a function of minimum modified tau. The left plot of Figure 
12 shows the cumulative distribution of encounter rates as a function of minimum modified tau, where the blue line 
represents the D1.1 baseline condition from Table 1 (DMOD=0.80 nmi, ZTHR=600 ft, and HMD=4000 ft) where 
time to co-altitude threshold is 0 seconds, and the green and red lines have the same parameters as D1.1 except for 
an increase and decrease of ZTHR (given by condition D1.2 and D1.3 where ZTHR is 450 ft and 800 ft), 
respectively. The right plot in Figure 12 shows the sensitivity of the encounter rate to changes in ZTHR with respect 
to the baseline D1.1 condition. The sensitivity is measured by the following equation %  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑡𝑜  𝑍𝑇𝐻𝑅 = 100 ∗ !"#$%"&'(  !"#$!!!"#$%"&'(  !!"#!!.!!"#$!!!"#$!!.!  , (14) 
where x represents the new configuration,  D1.1 is the definition from Table 1, and the parameter being changed is 
ZTHR. Figure 12 demonstrates that the relative impact to the encounter rates is approximately proportional to the 
magnitude of changes to the ZTHR parameter. For instance a 33% increase in the ZTHR parameter yielded 
approximately a 24% increase in the rate of encounters. This 24% increase was nearly constant for all values of 
modified tau. This result implies that the ZTHR parameter is minimally influenced by the time horizon and likely 
many of the encounters are level rather than transitioning (climbing or descending) conflicts. 
Figure 12: Cumulative distribution of encounter rate vs minimum modified tau for different ZTHR values 
(Left). The sensitivity of changes to the ZTHR parameter as compared to the D1.1 definition (Right). 
 Similar to the variation of ZTHR, the distance modification (DMOD) constant can be varied to investigate its 
impact on encounter rate. Using the same baseline definition D1.1 as in Figure 12, the cumulative distribution of 
encounter rates as a function of minimum modified tau with variations on DMOD are given in the left plot of Figure 
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13. The sensitivity to the DMOD parameter is given in right plot of Figure 13 and mimics the equation in (14) for
the DMOD parameter rather than ZTHR. It is clear from the plot that there is a negligible impact from decreasing
DMOD and a significant impact at smaller modified tau values from increasing DMOD. The equation given in (3)
explains this phenomenon as DMOD is used as a threat boundary parameter which will set the modified tau
calculation to zero when aircraft come within that parameter value. This is noticeable in the large increase in the y-
intercept of Figure 13. Furthermore, it is evident from (3) that for smaller ranges the DMOD term has more
influence on reducing the modified tau value. Increasing the DMOD parameter will have the greatest impact in the
collision avoidance time horizon (0 to approximately 30 seconds).
Figure 13: Cumulative distribution of encounter rate vs. minimum modified tau for different DMOD values 
(Left). Sensitivity of changes to the DMOD parameter as a compared to D1.1 definition (Right). 
The variation to the horizontal miss distance (HMD) constant is given in the plots of Figure 14. The horizontal 
miss distance is calculated by projecting the velocity vector of the current state to a future state to determine if the 
range at a future state is within the HMD threshold. Similar to the variation for DMOD, a larger impact on 
increasing the HMD parameter as opposed to decreasing it can be observed. A decrease in the HMD parameter 
produces a negligible reduction in rate of losses of well clear due to using trajectory predictions based on dead 
reckoning and intruder aircraft that maneuver and accelerate relative to the ownship. As the HMD parameter starts 
to increase, the impacts are more noticeable at the smaller time horizons as the effects of the noise due to 
maneuvering aircraft are less pronounced.  
Figure 14: Cumulative distribution of encounter rate vs. minimum modified tau for different HMD values 
(Left). Sensitivity of changes to the HMD parameter as a compared to D1.1 definition (Right). 
It is evident from the previous set of figures that DMOD and HMD produce similar changes in the encounter 
rate. From the TCAS II sensitivity level definitions, it was determined that DMOD and HMD should have the same 
parameter values at each of the sensitivity levels. Figure 15 demonstrates the impact of varying both the DMOD and 
HMD parameters. Both DMOD and HMD are set to the same value and then both parameters are increased and 
decreased concurrently. It is evident the encounter rates and sensitivities follow the same trend when both 
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parameters are increased. When the parameters are decreased, the sensitivity is larger at the small modified tau 
values but has a smaller impact on the rate of losses of well clear at the larger values of modified tau. 
Figure 15: Cumulative distribution of encounter rate vs. minimum modified tau for different DMOD and 
HMD values (Left). Sensitivity of changes to the DMOD and HMD parameter as a compared to D1.1 
definition (Right). 
 In summary, Analysis 1 focused on the impact of variations in the parameters of the well clear definition by 
comparing the sensitivity of the parameter to the rate of UAS encountering a VFR aircraft per flight hour. The rate 
of encounters was evaluated over a time horizon, measured by the minimum modified tau. The results from this 
analysis can be used to evaluate how modifications to the well clear definition. This analysis can also inform the 
alerting criteria needed to alert the UAS operator that action is necessary (referred to as the self separation 
threshold), and would influence the number of aircraft that would encounter the UAS per flight hour. The encounter 
rates for alerting and the well clear definition can be used in the instantiation of a safety case to evaluate the risk of 
collision and to inform the rate of alerting the pilot would expect due to current operations in the NAS.  
B. Analysis 2
In contrast to Analysis 1, which focused on parameter variation of a well clear definition; Analysis 2 instantiates 
a well clear boundary definition and investigates the relative state characteristics at the moment the boundary is 
crossed. This analysis will consider three definitions of well clear, two definitions were proposed by the SaRP (D2.1 
and D2.2), and the third was proposed in the RTCA SC-228 Detect and Avoid Working Group (D2.3). All three 
definitions are based on the modified tau calculation with a horizontal miss distance at the predicted closest point of 
approach as detailed in equations (7)-(9).  
The aggregate statistics are outlined in Table 6, where it is clear that the well clear definition D2.3 yields the 
fewest losses of well clear. Additionally the simulation produced 270 NMAC over the 23 simulation days and 
yielded a probability of NMAC given a loss of well clear of approximately 1.5% and 1.6% for the D2.1 and D2.2 
well clear definitions, respectively. The SaRP tuned the D2.1 and D2.2 definitions to a 1.5% unmitigated risk of 
NMAC given a loss of well clear using the MIT Lincoln Lab’s Uncorrelated Encounter Model, and the results from 
the ACES simulation are consistent with the tuned unmitigated risk from the encounter model. D2.3 is based on 
D2.2 but decreases the ZTHR value to 450 ft, and this yields an unmitigated risk of NMAC given a loss of well clear 
of 2.2%.  
One interoperability consideration for a well clear definition is how often an intruder’s TCAS II would alert prior 
to a loss of well clear. The premise is that if TCAS II is alerting either the UAS operator or the intruder aircraft, then 
there has been a loss of well clear between the aircraft. The TCAS II alert in Table 6 is the combination of the 
preventative alerts and corrective alerts. From the statistics it is clear that D2.2 produces the lowest probability of a 
TCAS II alert, whereas D2.3 produces the highest. In today’s operations, IFR and VFR aircraft are legally separated 
by a 500 ft altitude difference. According to the proposed well clear definitions, D2.1 and D2.3 would not register a 
loss of well clear if aircraft were at this 500-ft altitude separation, however D2.2 would register a loss of well clear. 
Table 6 demonstrates the trade-off between the operational acceptability of having a definition that is less than 500-
ft in the altitude separation, denoted by ZTHR, and the interoperability and unmitigated risk of an NMAC given a 
loss of well clear. 
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DMOD & HMD
D2.1 D2.2 D2.3 
Number of UAS Flight Hours 25,734 25,734 25,734 
Number of Losses of Well Clear 18,139 16,867 11,938 
Number of NMACS 270 270 270 
Probability of NMACs given a Loss of Well Clear 1.5% 1.6% 2.2% 
Probability of TCAS II RAs prior to Loss of Well Clear 4.8% 0.9% 8.6% 
Table 6: Aggregate statistics for well clear definitions over 23 simulated days 
Figure 16 depicts the rate of losses of well clear per flight hour grouped by the season for each of the three well 
clear definitions outlined in Table 2. It is clear from this bar chart that definition D2.1, which includes the time-to-
co-altitude and the largest horizontal miss distance of the three definitions, has a much larger rate of losses of well 
clear, which is due to the larger airspace volume that is being protected by this definition. Since D2.1 and D2.2 were 
tuned to the same risk of collision it is expected that their rate of losses of well clear would be similar. When 
comparing D2.3 and D2.2 it is clear that the decrease in ZTHR to 450 ft in D2.3 has a large impact on the rate of 
losses of well clear (1 loss of well clear per 50 hours for D2.3 as compared to 1 loss of well clear per 40 hours for 
D2.2). It is also interesting to note that the seasonal effects have minimal impact on the rate of losses of well clear. 
. 
Figure 16: Losses of well clear per flight hour for three well clear definitions (D2.1-D2.3). 
 The three well clear definitions used in Analysis 2 have similarities to the alerting logic in TCAS II. The TCAS 
alerting logic established sensitivity levels, which vary the parameters of the definition based on altitude. These 
sensitivity levels were included to manage the tradeoff between necessary airspace protection and unnecessary 
advisories. Higher sensitivity levels, which produce larger protected airspace around each TCAS-equipped aircraft, 
are selected at higher altitudes to account for higher closure rates between aircraft. The well clear definitions (D2.1-
D2.3) use a constant set of parameters for all altitudes. Figure 18 shows a set of histograms for the definition D2.3 at 
each altitude layer. It is evident from these histograms that the range of altitudes between 1,000-6,000 ft contain the 
highest range rates and the largest quantity of encounters. This result implies that the rate of loss of well clear is not 
driven by high range rates at the higher altitudes. Rather, the closure rates are comparable at the middle altitude 
layers, and a well clear definition might not need sensitivity levels at different altitudes.  
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Figure 17: Histograms for definition D2.3 of the number of losses of well clear as a function of horizontal 
range rate for each altitude layer. 
 Figure 18 shows a similar trend between the three definitions. The figure depicts the well clear violation rates as 
a function of altitude layer and demonstrates diminishing returns for protecting more airspace at higher altitudes, as 
the rates of losses of well clear violations are negligible.  
Figure 18: Losses of well clear per flight hour for three well clear definitions (D2.1-2.3) per altitude (MSL) 
layer 
The relative heading between an intruder aircraft and the UAS ownship aircraft is shown for the three well clear 
definitions D2.1-D2.3 in Figure 19. The orientation of the plot is such that the ownship is at the origin and a head on 
encounter is represented by the 180 degree tick mark, whereas an overtaking encounter is represented at the 0 degree 
tick mark. The figure depicts 99%, 90%, 80%, and 60% contours for each of the well clear definitions. These 
contours represent the percentage of data contained within the contour. For instance, in the D2.1 relative heading 
plot, the blue line indicates that 99% of the losses of well clear are within 4 nmi of the ownship. The three well clear 
definitions yield similar results, as all contours are less than 4 nmi. It can be concluded that in order to avoid a loss 
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of well clear a DAA system would require a sensor that could see no less than 4-5 nmi in front of the aircraft. The 
shape of the contours implies that an intruder overtaking a UAS would yield a loss of well clear at a much closer 
range then an intruder and UAS in a head-on conflict. It can be concluded that the DAA system should be equipped 
with a sensor that can detect intruders behind the UAS at no less than 3 nmi in order to account for losses of well 
clear due to overtaking encounters. 
Figure 19: Relative heading for definitions D2.1-D2.3 where contours for the boundaries are shown for the 
99%, 90%, 80%, and 60% of the losses of well clear. 
 The relative heading plots in Figure 19 also provide insight on the relationship between the angle at which the 
ownship encounters intruders and the range at which those intruders induce a loss of well clear. However, the 
vertical separation information is lost in this plot as all encounters are superimposed on each other. The subsequent 
figures will depict relationships between other parameters that define an encounter, however for brevity the plots 
will be shown only for definition D2.3, which is the well clear definition that has been proposed by the RTCA 
Special Committee 228 on Detect and Avoid Standards.  
 The spatial relationship between horizontal and vertical separation for a single well clear definition D2.3 is 
depicted in Figure 20. On the y-axis and x-axis is a histogram of the vertical and horizontal separations, respectively, 
at the instance of loss of well clear. The figure shows the spatial relationship between vertical and horizontal 
separation where the points represent separation at losses of well clear and the color corresponds to the number of 
losses of well clear at that spatial separation. It is evident from the figure that there are a number of losses of well 
clear that occur at the vertical separation boundary (450 ft) at a close proximity horizontally (< 1nmi). This is due to 
aircraft that are climbing or descending on the UAS ownship aircraft (or the ownship climbing or descending on an 
intruder aircraft) and not satisfying the vertical condition in equation (8) until they are within a close horizontal 
proximity from the ownship. It is also interesting to note that there is a near uniform distribution of losses of well 
clear at separations that are not along the vertical separation boundary (450 ft). The horizontal separation 
distribution is skewed towards the closer separation distances, however there is a large number of losses of well 
clear that occur at approximately 1.5 nmi separation from the UAS ownship. This result demonstrates the effect of 
the temporal separation, given by modified tau, on the amount of protected airspace. While the horizontal miss 
distance (approx. 0.658 nmi) is specified as the spatial boundary, given the closure rates of the intruders the 
modified tau criteria significantly extends the protected airspace to much larger (approx. 2nmi ) for most of the 
encounters. 
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Figure 20: Scatter plot of horizontal and vertical separation for definition D2.3 at the first loss of well clear. 
Figure 21: Scatter plot of horizontal separation and horizontal range rates for definition D2.3 at the first loss 
of well clear. 
 Figure 21 depicts the relationship between the horizontal range rates and the horizontal separation at the first loss 
of well clear for the D2.3 well clear definition. In this plot, horizontal range rate represents how timely aircraft are 
approaching each other, where the more negative the range rate the faster the aircraft are coming together, and a 
positive range rate implies the aircraft are on diverging paths. Similar to Figure 20, the histograms are provided on 
each of the axes and the color of the scatter plot corresponds to the density of aircraft pairs that had a loss of well 
clear. The scatter plot has a clear linear relationship between 0.658 nmi and 5 nmi that represents the modified tau 
time threshold of 35 seconds. Encounters occurring between 0.658 nmi and 5 nmi separation and under the 35-
second modified tau line represent violations that happened at a modified tau less than 35 seconds. The higher the 
range rate the lower the modified tau value at the first loss of well clear. Points on the scatter plot that occurred 
closer than 0.658 nmi separation encroached on the threat boundary defined by DMOD (0.658 nmi) and ZTHR (450 
ft). Specifically, a subset of the losses of well clear at the threat boundary had a positive range rate. These cases 
represent aircraft that were climbing or descending behind the UAS within the threat boundary. Air traffic 
controllers typically would consider these scenarios clear of conflict as the aircraft have already passed each other 
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and are on diverging paths, however given this well clear definition these cases would register to the DAA system as 
a loss of well clear and may request that the UAS operator initiate a collision avoidance maneuver. It is clear to see 
that this well clear definition could produce the most losses of well clear at 1.5-2 nmi where intruders have closure 
rates of 180-200 knots. 
Figure 22: Scatter plot of vertical separation and vertical range rates for definition D2.3 at first loss of well 
clear. 
A scatter plot of the altitude separation and vertical range rate for the D2.3 well clear definition is depicted in 
Figure 22, along with the histograms along each of the axes. In this plot it is evident that losses of well clear are 
occurring along the vertical threat boundary, denoted as ZTHR, and at a vertical range rate of zero feet per minute. 
This implies that a large portion of the losses of well clear occur while aircraft pairs are level with each other and 
vertically offset. The scatter plot also denotes a high-density area where the relative aircraft pairs are vertically 
converging at a rate of 1000 feet per minute and incurring a loss of well clear at the 450 ft threat boundary. These 
vertical closures are a relative measure and therefore could be caused from the intruder climb/descending on the 
ownship, the ownship climbing/descending on the intruder, or both the ownship and intruder climbing/descending 
into each other. 
Figure 23 depicts the percentage of encounters resulting in a loss of well clear due to different types of 
maneuvering for definition D2.3. As expected, the majority of encounters are a result of aircraft flying straight and 
level on converging paths. The cases in which either the ownship is turning and the intruder is straight and level or 
the intruder is turning and the ownship are straight and level each constitute 5-6% of the encounters. An aircraft 
exceeding 3 degrees per second heading rate defines the turn in Figure 23. It is rare for a loss of well clear to occur 
when both the intruder and ownship are turning. There appears to be a larger percentage of transitioning encounters 
in which either both aircraft are climbing/descending, the ownship is climbing/descending and the intruder is 
straight and level, or the intruder is climbing/descending and the ownship is straight and level. There are other 
permutations between the ownship and the intruder, which consist of about 12-14 % of the encounters that resulted 
in a loss of well clear. 
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Figure 23: Aircraft maneuvering at first loss of well clear for definition D2.3. 
In summary, Analysis 2 investigated the characteristics of encounters at the well clear boundary. This included 
the rate at which aircraft encroach that boundary, the relative separation, heading, and range rates, as well as the 
relative state of the aircraft pair. These results have implications to the safety of the well clear definition as they 
expose areas where the well clear boundary will be exercised based on current VFR traffic in the airspace. For 
comparison, three well clear definitions were presented, however for brevity, relative statistics were only presented 
for the D2.3 definition. It was observed that seasonal variation had limited influence on the rate of encounters, 
sensor ranges need to be chosen at a sufficient minimum distance as to capture most losses of well clear (3-5 nmi), 
the DAA system may need logic to protect against alerting the pilot to losses of well clear that occur while the 
aircraft are on diverging paths, and the majority of conflicts are resulting from level conflicts, however transitioning 
conflicts do occur in significant numbers and at moments in which aircraft are at close proximity (< 1 nmi) with 
each other. These results expose the need for effective alerting and vigilance by the UAS operator to maintain safety 
for UAS operations in the NAS. 
C. Analysis 3
Analysis 3 investigates criteria by which to alert the UAS operator that action is necessary to avoid a potential 
loss of well clear. This analysis considers an extension of the well clear boundary parameters for alerting, and 
parameters of the alerting definition will be varied. The analysis will focus on the relative state between the aircraft 
pairs in conflict at the first alert. In particular the range rates, relative heading and separation are of interest, as well 
as the percentage of alerts that did not result in a loss of well clear. While Analysis 2 assessed the safety 
implications of aircraft that were in a loss of separation, Analysis 3 will assess the impact to the UAS operator based 
on the frequency of alerts, their timeliness, and the relative state between the aircraft at the first alert. All of these 
have implications for the DAA sensor requirements.  
The configurations used in the analysis are based on the well clear definition given by definition D2.3 and 
detailed in Table 3. The parameters that are varied in this analysis are: the self-separation threshold for modified tau, 
denoted as 𝜏∗!"#, the altitude separation threshold, denoted by ZTHR, and the minimum miss distance modification 
variables DMOD and HMD. Definition D3.1 uses the definition for well clear in D2.3 (modified tau of 35 seconds, 
DMOD of 0.658 nmi, ZTHR of 450 ft and HMD of 4000 ft) and extends the self-separation threshold (SST) to 90 
seconds. This in effect is adding a buffer on the temporal dimension. Definition D3.2 extends this idea by adding a 
buffer to both the time threshold of 90 seconds and the altitude threshold of 700 ft. The temporal aspect of the 
alerting criteria is anticipated to be the most impact, therefore D3.3 and D3.4 use the definition of D3.2 and extend 
the self-separation threshold to 110 seconds and decrease the self-separation threshold to 70 seconds, respectively. 
Definition D3.5 uses the definition D3.2 and extends the minimum separation thresholds to 6000 ft HMD and 0.987 
nmi DMOD. The vertical separation threshold and minimum horizontal separation threshold are increased with 
respect to D3.2 in the D3.6 definition. The selection of the self-separation threshold will largely be driven by the 
minimum sufficient time required for the UAS operator to receive an alert, gain situation awareness, determine the 
threat and a possible resolution, if time permits contact air traffic control and request a clearance amendment, 
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command the UAS to perform a self-separation maneuver, and for the aircraft to execute the maneuver. An 
excessively large SST would produce frequent alerts to the pilot and a threshold that is too small may give the pilot, 
an insufficient amount of time to avoid a loss of well clear. The buffers added to the minimum horizontal and 
vertical separation thresholds are to account for sensor, navigation, and maneuver uncertainty. 
D3.1 D3.2 D3.3 D3.4 D3.5 D3.6 
Number of UAS Flight Hours 25,734 25,734 25,734 25,734 25,734 25,734 
Number of Alerts 21,319 29,230 35,754 23,712 37,182 44,116 
Number of losses of well clear (using D2.3) 11,938 11,938 11,938 11,938 11,938 11,938 
Number of NMACS 270 270 270 270 270 270 
Probability of a loss of well clear given an alert 55.9% 40.8% 33.3% 50.3% 32.1% 27.0% 
Probability of NMAC given an alert 1.26% 0.92% 0.75% 1.13% 0.72% 0.61% 
Table 7: Aggregate statistics for alerting criteria over 23 simulated days 
The aggregated statistics for the number of alerts over the 23 simulated days are presented in Table 7. As 
expected, the number of alerts scale with the size of the airspace monitored by the alerting criteria. The results show 
the smaller the buffered volume the larger the probability of NMAC and larger the probability of a loss of well clear. 
The unmitigated probability of loss of well clear given a SST alert and the probability of a NMAC given an SST 
alert are two metrics that are useful in the derivation of two risk ratios for the DAA safety cases. The risk ratio 
measures the relative effectiveness of mitigation, and the metrics presented in Table 7 form the denominator of the 
two risk ratios, where the numerator corresponds to the mitigated probability of loss of well clear given an SST alert 
and the mitigated probability of NMAC given an SST alert. The subsequent figures will explore the characteristics 
of the alerts and the encounters. 
Figure 24: Rate of alerts issued per flight hour 
 Figure 24 depicts a histogram of the rate of alerts that were issued per flight hour for each of the alerting 
definitions. It is interesting to note that the well clear definition D2.3 produced an unmitigated loss of well clear 
once every 50 hours, whereas extending just the SST for alerting produced an alert rate at once every 28 hours, as 
shown by D3.1. By increasing the ZTHR in D3.2, an alert was issued once every 20 hours, as shown in D3.2. 
Comparing D3.2 alerting rate to D3.6 it can be observed that the threat boundary defined by DMOD, ZTHR and 
HMD have a large effect and produces an alert once every 13 hours when all parameters were increased as given by 
D3.6. The alerts can be distracting to a UAS operator if they occur too frequently. In addition, if alerts that are 
issued are not representative of an actual potential threat to the UAS then confidence in the automation can be lost. 
The SST is intended to alert the pilot that action is necessary to avoid an imminent threat. Therefore, if a UAS 
operator consistently is alerted to proximate aircraft that are not likely to pose an imminent threat, then the operator 
may determine that the alerting is inaccurate and adaptive their behavior to disregard the alerts. While this alerting is 
not directly a safety concern it can raise the workload of the UAS operator, which could lead to a hazardous 
situation. In this work we define nuisance alerts as alerts that were predicted to lose well clear at a future time but 
ultimately would not result in a loss of well clear if no action was taken. In some contexts these alerts have also been 
described as false alerts with respect to the well clear definition. 
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 Figure 25 depicts a histogram of the percentage of nuisance alerts for each of the alerting definitions. As 
expected the larger buffered volume for alerting yields the larger percentage of nuisance alerts. It is clear from 
Figure 25 that the SST is a large driver in the nuisance alert percentage. The maneuvering of either the intruder or 
the ownship causes these nuisance alerts, therefore a larger SST allows for a longer time horizon upon which either 
aircraft could maneuver. One disadvantage of the alerting logic is that both the UAS and intruder aircraft states are 
projected forward in time using dead reckoning, therefore if either aircraft is currently maneuvering alerts may be 
issued even though the aircraft have a minimal likelihood of a conflict. So while the alert is correct based on the 
linear state projection, the lack of knowledge of intended flight path of the UAS would cause the alert to be issued 
when there is no imminent collision threat present. It is expected that the percentage of nuisance alerts would be 
lower if the trajectory intent of UAS ownship were considered in the alerting logic.  
Figure 25: Percentage of nuisance alerts issued for each of the alerting definitions. 
 In addition to the frequency and reliability of alerts, it is also important that the alerting is timely enough for the 
pilot to perform a maneuver prior to a well clear violation. Figure 26 depicts a box-and-whiskers plot of the time 
until the loss of well clear. In this plot, the box represents the data between the 25th and 75th percentiles, the line 
inside the box represents the median, the plus symbol represents the mean and the solid black line represents the 
whiskers, which denote the 9th and 91st percentile values. Data outside the span of the whiskers are considered 
outliers and omitted from this plot. It is clear from D3.1 that when no buffers are present it is possible for aircraft to 
not pose a threat until after they are within 35 seconds modified tau, which is the boundary of the well clear 
definition. For a head-on encounter scenario, the definition D3.1 should yield a time to loss of well clear of 55 
seconds, however it is clear that the mean (30 seconds) and median (17 seconds) are far below that value. This result 
demonstrates that due to maneuvering intruders relative to the UAS ownship, often aircraft will induce an alert at a 
modified tau lower than the SST. Comparing D3.1 and D3.2 depicts the impact of the vertical buffering on ZTHR, 
where it is evident that the mean and median of the time to well clear increases. Adding a vertical buffer appears to 
be a necessity, as it increases both the mean and median of the alerts above 25 seconds. Increasing the alerting time 
expands the range of how early alerts are issued, however it is evident from D3.2-D3.6 that the percentage of alerts 
issued late is a function of the size of the buffers on their vertical and horizontal minimum separation distances. 
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Figure 26: Time to loss of well clear at first alert for each of the alerting definitions. 
Another important aspect of the alerting logic that has implications for the sensor requirements is the relative range 
between the intruder and ownship at the first alert. While Figure 19 in Analysis 2 inferred the minimum range 
required of the sensor to detect all intruders at the well-clear boundary, Figure 27 informs the minimum sensor 
requirements needed to detect an intruder for a given SST. Figure 27 depicts a relative heading plot where 99% of 
the data is contained within each contour for each alerting definition.  In order to avoid a loss of well clear, the 
alerting logic needs to ensure that a UAS operator has sufficient time to detect and resolve the conflict. This result 
informs what surveillance range is needed to detect intruders given an SST. Future studies will consider a resolution 
algorithm and human-in-the-loop (HiTL) evaluation to determine whether the SST defined is sufficient to avoid a 
loss of well clear. Figure 27 illustrates when the SST is set to 70 seconds the sensor requirements would be 7 nmi 
head-on and 4 nmi in-trail, whereas if the SST is set to 110 seconds the sensor requirements are extended to 12 nmi 
and 6 nmi in-trail. 
Figure 27: Relative heading at the first alert for all alerting definitions. 
 To provide more information about the characteristics of the intruder aircraft, the subsequent plots consider the 
D3.2 definition and depict the relative heading, spatial separation and closure rates at the time of first alert. Figure 
28 depicts the relative heading, where the contours represent the boundaries within which 99%, 90%, 80%, and 60% 
of the alerts are contained. In developing surveillance requirements, it is feasible that the results from HiTL and fast-
time simulations may yield an SST range that is acceptable for avoiding a loss of well clear, however inherently 
extends the surveillance range beyond the limits of current technology. In this scenario, the standards may specify an 
acceptable number of late alerts to ease the burden on the technology requirements. Figure 28 indicates the 
percentage of alerts that would still be issued from a reduced surveillance range. The alerts that would have occurred 
between the required surveillance range dictated by the acceptable SST and the reduced surveillance range dictated 
by the technology are expected to manifest themselves as late alerts due to the reduced surveillance range. 
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Figure 28: Relative heading for definitions D3.2 where contours for the boundaries are shown within which 
99%, 90%, 80%, and 60% of the alerts occurred. 
Figure 28 does not reflect the altitude information, as alerts at all altitude layers are super-imposed on each other to 
display the relative heading and range information. Figure 29 illustrates a scatter plot of the spatial relationship 
between the horizontal separation and vertical separation between the intruder and ownship at the instance of the 
alert. Similar to observations in Analysis 2 with the D2.3 well clear definition, it is evident the vertical separation is 
nearly uniform except at the boundary conditions. The horizontal separation tends to have more alerts between 3-7 
nmi, whereas the alerts are more sparse outside those ranges. 
Figure 29: Scatter plot of horizontal and vertical separation for definition 3.2 at the first alert. 
 Figure 30 depicts a histogram of the horizontal and vertical range rates at the first alert for definition D3.2. In 
rare cases, encounters with cooperative VFR traffic have maximum closure rates up to 500 knots. The mean 
horizontal range rate is -211 knots with a +/- 86 knots standard deviation, and the mean for the vertical range rate is -
5 feet per minute with a standard deviation of 14 feet per minute. The typical closure rates the UAS can expect with 
VFR traffic is between 0-400 knots, with most of those being level encounters. 
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Figure 30: Histograms of horizontal range rate (left) and vertical range rate (right) for the alerting definition 
D3.2. 
In summary, Analysis 3 was an initial investigation of the impact of parameters of the alerting criteria on the 
frequency of alerts and encounter characteristics. It was shown that the minimum horizontal and vertical separation 
distances had a meaningful impact on the frequency of alerting. It is evident that while adding buffer to the well 
clear definition for alerting is beneficial, as was shown on the increased time until loss of well clear box-and-
whisker plots, making the buffers too large will produce more frequent alerts for the UAS operators and likely more 
nuisance alerts. Analysis 3 also presented data to inform the inferred sensor range detection requirements for a given 
SST, as well as inform the trade-off between sensor coverage and late alerts when there is a gap between required 
performance and technological state of the art for airborne surveillance. 
VI. Concluding Remarks
 A UAS operation will have to comply with the regulatory see-and-avoid requirements by equipping with a DAA 
system. While manned aviation can rely on an onboard pilot to maintain a safe proximity or “well clear” of other 
aircraft based on their subjective judgment, a UAS must have a clear analytical definition to establish the minimum 
separation that is allowable to safely operate in the NAS. The results presented in this work are predicated on the 
assumption that an analytical definition of well clear is considered a separation standard between UAS and other 
aircraft. Three analyses were conducted using a NAS-wide fast-time simulation platform. Nine UAS missions 
consisting of approximately 18,000 flights were simulated against twenty-three days of historical cooperative VFR 
aircraft traffic. The UAS and VFR aircraft received no mitigation to avoid separation conflicts.   
 Analysis 1 focused on the impact on the rate of loss of well clear from varying parameters of a modified tau with 
horizontal miss distance well clear definition. The results demonstrated characteristic behavior of each of the 
definitions as well as identified the frequency of losses of separation those parameter changes would incur. For 
instance, for a well clear definition of modified tau threshold =40 seconds, DMOD=0.80 nmi, ZTHR=600 ft, and 
HMD=4000 ft and time to co-altitude = 0 seconds, a loss of well clear once every 30.3 UAS flight hours was 
observed, whereas increasing HMD by 23% yielded a loss of well clear once every 26 hours. The results from this 
analysis can be used to evaluate how modifications to the well clear definition or the alerting criteria for the UAS 
operator would impact the rate of losses of well clear or alerts that the UAS operator could expect to encounter. The 
encounter rates for alerting and the well clear definition can be used in a safety case to evaluate the unmitigated risk 
of collision. 
 Analysis 2 focused on the characteristics of encounters at the well clear definition boundary. Three different well 
clear definitions were considered, including the definition accepted by the RTCA Special Committee 228 DAA 
working group. The analysis established a minimum sensor range of 5 nmi head-on and 3 nmi in-trail required to 
detect losses of well clear. This analysis will inform the stakeholder organizations making operational standards as 
to the characteristics of the traffic that will be encountered, the unmitigated risk associated with the well clear 
definition, contribute to the risk ratio calculation to evaluate the performance of the DAA system, as well as expose 
any strengths and weaknesses of the definition itself. 
 Analysis 3 focused on the alerting criteria used to inform the UAS operator of an imminent loss of well clear. 
This analysis investigated the impact of adding buffers to parameters of a well clear definition from Analysis 2 to 
use for alerting. Analysis 3 informs the impact to the UAS operator based on the frequency of alerting, the 
timeliness of alert, and the relative state between the aircraft at the first alert, which have implications for the DAA 
sensor requirements. A key result from this analysis is to motivate the need for buffers on the minimum horizontal 
29  
−500 −400 −300 −200 −100
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
A
le
rt
s
Horizontal Range Rate [kts]
−6000 −4000 −2000 0 2000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
A
le
rt
s
Vertical Range Rate [fpm]
and vertical separation in the well clear definitions, which allows alerts to get issued with more time for the UAS 
operator to initiate a resolution maneuver. It was also observed that the SST increases the span at which alerts are 
being issued, giving the pilot more time for maneuvering, but at the cost of requiring more capable sensors and the 
potential for more nuisance alerts. The three analysis presented help inform the safety case, requirements 
development, and operational environment of the DAA operational standards. 
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